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Abstract. Baldi et al. proposed a variant of McEliece’s cryptosystem. The main idea is to replace
its permutation matrix by adding to it a rank 1 matrix. The motivation for this change is twofold: it
would allow the use of codes that were shown to be insecure in the original McEliece’s cryptosystem,
and it would reduce the key size while keeping the same security against generic decoding attacks. The
authors suggest to use generalized Reed-Solomon codes instead of Goppa codes. The public code built
with this method is not anymore a generalized Reed-Solomon code. On the other hand, it contains a
very large secret generalized Reed-Solomon code. In this paper we present an attack that is built upon
a distinguisher which is able to identify elements of this secret code. The distinguisher is constructed
by considering the code generated by component-wise products of codewords of the public code (the
so-called “square code”). By using square-code dimension considerations, the initial generalized Reed-
Solomon code can be recovered which permits to decode any ciphertext. A similar technique has already
been successful for mounting an attack [GOT12] against a homomorphic encryption scheme suggested
by [BL11]. This work can be viewed as another illustration of how a distinguisher of Reed-Solomon
codes can be used to devise an attack on cryptosystems based on them.
Keywords. Code-based cryptography, McEliece, distinguisher.
1 Introduction
Reed-Solomon codes have been suggested for the first time in a public-key cryptosystem in [Nie86]
but it was shown to be insecure in [SS92]. The attack recovers the underlying Reed-Solomon allowing
the decoding of any encrypted data obtained from a McEliece-type cryptosystem based on them.
The McEliece cryptosystem [McE78] on the other hand uses Goppa codes. Since its apparition,
it has withstood many attacks and after more than thirty years now, it still belongs to the very
few unbroken public key cryptosystems. This situation substantiates the claim that inverting the
encryption function, and in particular recovering the private key from public data, is intractable.
No significant breakthrough has been observed with respect to the problem of recovering the
private key [Gib91,LS01]. This has led to claim that the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code
does not disclose any visible structure that an attacker could exploit. This is strengthened by the fact
that Goppa codes share many characteristics with random codes: for instance they asymptotically
meet the Gilbert-Varshamov bound, they typically have a trivial permutation group, etc. This is
the driving motivation for conjecturing the hardness of the Goppa code distinguishing problem,
which asks whether a Goppa code can be distinguished from a random code. This has become
a classical belief in code-based cryptography, and semantic security in the random oracle model
[NIKM08], CCA2 security in the standard model [DMQN09] and security in the random oracle
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model against existential forgery [Dal07] of the signature scheme [CFS01] are now proved by using
this assumption.
In [FGO+11], an algorithm that manages to distinguish between a random code and a Goppa
code has been introduced. This work without undermining the security of [McE78] prompts to
wonder whether it would be possible to devise an attack based on such a distinguisher. It was found
out in [MCP12] that our distinguisher [FGO+11] has an equivalent but simpler description in terms
of the component-wise product of codes. This notion was first put forward in coding theory to unify
many different algebraic decoding algorithms [Pel92,Ko¨t92]. Recently, it was used in [MCMMP11a]
to study the security of cryptosystems based on Algebraic-Geometric codes. Powers of codes are
also studied in the context of secure multi-party computation (see for example [CCCX09,CCX11]).
This distinguisher is even more powerful in the case of Reed-Solomon codes than for Goppa codes
because, whereas for Goppa codes it is only successful for rates close to 1, it can distinguish Reed-
Solomon codes of any rate from random codes.
In this paper we propose a cryptanalysis against a variant of McEliece’s cryptosystem [McE78]
proposed in [BBC+11] which is based on on the aforementioned version of our distinguisher pre-
sented in [MCP12]. The main idea of this proposal is to replace the permutation matrix used to
hide the secret generator matrix by another matrix of the form Π + R where Π is a permuta-
tion matrix and R is a rank 1 matrix. The motivation for this change is twofold: it would allow
the use of codes that were shown to be insecure in the original McEliece’s cryptosystem. It also
allows to reduce the size of the keys which is a major drawback in code-based cryptography. In
this new setting it was suggested to use generalized Reed-Solomon codes. The public code obtained
with this method is not anymore a generalized Reed-Solomon code. On the other hand, it contains
a very large secret generalized Reed-Solomon code. Our attack consists is identifying this secret
Reed-Solomon code by picking at random a very small number of elements of the public code and
computing the dimension of the vector space generated by component-wise products of these ele-
ments with the public code. This technique is precisely what enables to distinguish a Reed-Solomon
code from a random code. In the case at hand, the dimension of the vector space is much smaller
when all elements belong to the secret Reed-Solomon code than in the generic case. This is precisely
what allows to recover the secret Reed-Solomon code. Once this secret code is obtained, it is then
possible to completely recover the initial generalized Reed-Solomon code by using the square-code
construction as in [Wie10]. We are then able to decode any ciphertext.
It should also be pointed out that the properties of Reed-Solomon codes with respect to the
component-wise product of codes have already been used to cryptanalyze a McEliece-like scheme
[BL05] based on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10]. The use of this product is nevertheless
different in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. Note also that our attack is not an adaptation of
the Sidelnikov and Shestakov approach [SS92]. Our approach is completely new: it illustrates how
a distinguisher that detects an abnormal behavior can be used to recover the private key. It should
also be added that a very similar technique has been successful to attack [GOT12] a homorphic
encryption scheme based on Reed-Solomon codes [BL11].
Organisation of the paper. In Section 2 we recall important notions from coding theory. In
Section 3 we describe the cryptosystem proposed in [BBC+11] and in Section 4 we explain an
attack of this system.
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2 Reed-Solomon Codes and the Square Code
We recall in this section a few relevant results and definitions from coding theory and bring in the
fundamental notion which is used in the attack, namely the square code. A linear code C of length
n and dimension k over a finite field GF (q) of q elements is a subspace of dimension k of the full
space GF (q)n. It is generally specified by a full-rank matrix called a generator matrix which is a
k × n matrix G (with k ≤ n) over GF (q) whose rows span the code:
C =
{
uG | u ∈ GF (q)k
}
.
It can also be specified by a parity-check matrix H , which is a matrix whose right kernel is equal
to the code, that is
C =
{
x ∈ GF (q)n | HxT = 0
}
,
where xT stands for the column vector which is the transpose of the row vector x. The rate of
the code is given by the ratio kn . Code-based public-key cryptography focuses on linear codes that
have a polynomial time decoding algorithm. The role of decoding algorithms is to correct errors
of prescribed weight. We say that a decoding algorithm corrects t errors if it recovers u from the
knowledge of uG+ e for all possible e ∈ Fnq of weight at most t.
Reed-Solomon codes form a special case of codes with a very powerful low complexity decoding
algorithm. It will be convenient to use the definition of Reed-Solomon codes and generalized Reed-
Solomon codes as evaluation codes
Definition 1 (Reed-Solomon code and generalized Reed-Solomon code). Let k and n be
integers such that 1 6 k < n 6 q where q is a power of a prime number. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be an
n-tuple of distinct elements of GF (q). The Reed-Solomon code RSk(x) of dimension k is the set of
(p(x1), . . . , p(xn)) when p ranges over all polynomials of degree 6 k− 1 with coefficients in GF (q).
The generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk(x,y) of dimension k is associated to a couple (x,y) ∈
GF (q)n × GF (q)n where x is chosen as above and the entries yi are arbitrary non zero elements
in GF (q). It is defined as the set of (y1p(x1), . . . , ynp(xn)) where p ranges over all polynomials of
degree 6 k − 1 with coefficients in GF (q).
Generalized Reed-Solomon codes are quite important in coding theory due to the conjunction
of several factors such as:
1. Their minimum distance d is maximal among all codes of the same dimension k and length n
because d is equal to n− k + 1.
2. They can be efficiently decoded in polynomial time when the number of errors is less than or
equal to
⌊
d− 1
2
⌋
=
⌊
n− k
2
⌋
.
It has been suggested to use them in a public-key cryptosystem for the first time in [Nie86] but
it was discovered that this scheme is insecure in [SS92]. Sidelnikov and Shestakov namely showed
that it is possible to recover in polynomial time for any generalized Reed-Solomon code a possible
couple (x,y) which defines it. This is all what is needed to decode efficiently such codes and is
therefore enough to break the Niederreiter cryptosystem suggested in [Nie86] or a McEliece type
cryptosystem [McE78] when Reed-Solomon are used instead of Goppa codes.
We could not find a way to adapt the Sidelnikov and Shestakov approach for recovering the
secret Generalized Reed-Solomon code from the public generating matrix Gpub in the Baldi et al.
scheme. However a Reed-Solomon displays a quite peculiar property with respect to the component-
wise product which is denoted by a ⋆ b for two vectors a = (a1, . . . , an) and b = (b1, . . . , bn) and
which is defined by a⋆b
def
= (a1b1, . . . , anbn). This can be seen by bringing in the following definition
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Definition 2 (Star product of codes – Square code). Let A and B be two codes of length
n. The star product code denoted by < A ⋆ B > of A and B is the vector space spanned by all
products a⋆b where a and b range over A and B respectively. When B = A , < A ⋆A > is called
the square code of A and is denoted by < A 2 >.
It is clear that < A ⋆ B > is also generated by the ai ⋆ bj’s where the ai’s and the bj ’s form a
basis of A and B respectively. Therefore
Proposition 1.
dim(< A ⋆ B >) ≤ dim(A ) dim(B).
We expect that the square code when applied to a random linear code should be a code of dimension
of order min
{(k+1
2
)
, n
}
. Actually it can be shown by the proof technique of [FGO+11] that with
probability going to 1 as k tends to infinity, the square code is of dimension min
{(k+1
2
)
(1 + o(1)), n
}
when k is of the form k = o(n1/2), see also [MCP12]. On the other hand generalized Reed Solomon
codes behave in a completely different way
Proposition 2. < GRSk(x,y)
2 >= GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y).
This follows immediately from the definition of a generalized Reed Solomon code as an evaluation
code since the star product of two elements c = (y1p(x1), . . . , ynp(xn)) and c
′ = (y1q(x1), . . . , ynq(xn))
of GRSk(x,y) where p and q are two polynomials of degree at most k − 1 is of the form
c ⋆ c′ = (y21p(x1)q(x2), . . . , y
2
np(xn)q(xn)) = (y
2
1r(x1), . . . , y
2
nr(xn))
where r is a polynomial of degree≤ 2k−2. Conversely, any element of the form (y21r(x1), . . . , y
2
nr(xn))
where r is a polynomial of degree less than or equal to 2k−1 is a linear combination of star products
of two elements of GRSk(x,y).
This proposition shows that the square code is only of dimension 2k−1 when 2k−1 ≤ n, which
is quite unusual. This property can also be used in the case 2k − 1 > n. To see this, consider the
dual of the Reed-Solomon code. The dual C⊥ of a code C of length n over GF (q) is defined by
C
⊥ = {x ∈ GF (q)n|x · y = 0,∀y ∈ C } ,
where x ·y =
∑
xiyi stands for the standard inner product between elements of GF (q)
n. The dual
of a generalized Reed-Solomon code is itself a generalized Reed-Solomon code, see [MS86, Theorem
4, p.304]
Proposition 3.
GRSk(x,y)
⊥ = GRSn−k(x,y
′)
where the length of GRSk(x,y) is n and y
′ is a certain element of GF (q)n depending on x and y.
Therefore when 2k− 1 > n a Reed-Solomon code GRSk(x,y) can also be distinguished from a
random linear code of the same dimension by computing the dimension of <
(
GRSk(x,y)
⊥
)2
>.
We have in this case
<
(
GRSk(x,y)
⊥
)2
>=< GRSn−k(x,y
′)2 >=<GRS2n−2k−1(x,y
′ ⋆ y′) >
and we obtain a code of dimension 2n− 2k − 1.
A Distinguisher-Based Attack on a Variant of McEliece’s Cryptosystem Based on Reed-Solomon Codes 5
The star product of two codes is the fundamental notion used in the decoding algorithm based
on an error correcting pair [Pel92,Ko¨t92] which unifies common ideas to many algebraic decoding
algorithms. It has been used for the first time to cryptanalyze a McEliece-like scheme [BL05] based
on subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [Wie10]. The use of the star product is nevertheless different
in [Wie10] from the way we use it here. In this paper, the star product is used to identify for a
certain subcode C of a generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk(x,y) a possible pair (x,y). This
is achieved by computing < C 2 > which in the case which is considered turns out to be equal to
< GRSk(x,y)
2 > which is equal to GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y). The Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm
is then used on < C 2 > to recover a possible (x,y ⋆ y) pair to describe < C 2 > as a generalized
Reed-Solomon code. From this, a possible (x,y) pair for which C ⊂ GRSk(x,y) is deduced.
3 Baldi et al. Variant of McEliece’s Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem proposed by Baldi et al. in [BBC+11] is a variant of McEliece’s cryptosystem
[McE78]. The main idea is to replace the permutation matrix used to hide the secret generator
matrix by one of the form Π +R where Π is a permutation matrix and R is a rank-one matrix.
From the authors’ point of view, this new kind of transformations would allow to use families of
codes that were shown insecure in the original McEliece’s cryptosystem. In particular, it would
become possible to use generalized Reed-Solomon codes in this new framework. The scheme can be
summarized as follows.
Secret key.
– Gsec is a generator matrix of a generalized Reed-Solomon code of length n and dimension
k over GF (q),
– Q
def
= Π +R where Π is an n× n permutation matrix,
– R is a rank-one matrix over GF (q) such that Q is invertible,
– S is a k × k random invertible matrix over GF (q).
Public key. Gpub
def
= S−1GsecQ
−1.
Encryption. The ciphertext c ∈ GF (q)n of a plaintext m ∈ GF (q)k is obtained by drawing at
random e in GF (q)n of weight less than or equal to n−k2 and computing c
def
= mGpub + e.
Decryption. It consists in performing the three following steps:
1. Guessing the value of eR;
2. Calculating c′
def
= cQ − eR = mS−1Gsec + eQ − eR = mS
−1Gsec + eΠ and using
the decoding algorithm of the generalized Reed-Solomon code to recover mS−1 from the
knowledge of c′;
3. Multiplying the result of the decoding by S to recover m.
The first step of the decryption, that is guessing the value eR, boils down to trying q elements
(in the worst case) since R is of rank 1. Indeed, there exist α
def
= (α1, . . . , αn) and β
def
= (β1, . . . , βn)
in GF (q)n such that R
def
= αTβ. Therefore eR = eαTβ = γβ where γ is an element of GF (q). The
second step of the decryption can also be performed efficiently because eΠ is of weight less than or
equal to n−k2 , and
n−k
2 errors can be corrected in polynomial time in a generalized Reed-Solomon
code of length n and dimension k by well-known standard decoding algorithms.
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4 Attack on the Baldi et al. Cryptosystem Using GRS Codes
4.1 Case where 2k + 2 < n
We define Csec and Cpub to be the codes generated by the matrices Gsec and Gpub respectively.
We denote by n the length of these codes and by k their dimension. We assume in this subsection
that
2k + 2 < n (1)
As explained in Section 3, Csec is a GRS code. It is also assumed in [BBC
+11] that the matrix
Q =Π+R is invertible. It will be convenient to bring in the code C
def
= CsecΠ
−1. The matrix R is
assumed to be of rank one. From Lemma 3 in Appendix A, the matrix RΠ−1 is also of rank one.
Hence there exist a and b in GF (q)n such that:
RΠ−1 = bTa. (2)
This code C , being a permutation of a generalized Reed-Solomon code, is itself a generalized Reed-
Solomon code. So there are elements x and y in GF (q)n such that C = GRSk(x,y). There is a
simple relation between Cpub and C as explained by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let λ
def
= − 11+a·bb. For any c in Cpub there exists p in C such that:
c = p+ (p · λ)a. (3)
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. From now on we make the assumption that
λ /∈ C⊥. (4)
If this is not the case then Cpub = C = GRSk(x,y) and there is straightforward attack by applying
the Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm [SS92]. It finds (x′,y′) that expresses Cpub asGRSk(x
′,y′).
This allows to easily decode Cpub.
Our attack relies on identifying a code of dimension k − 1 that is both a subcode of Cpub and
the Generalized Reed-Solomon code C . It consists more precisely of codewords p+ (p ·λ)a with p
in C such that p · λ = 0. This particular code which is denoted by Cλ⊥ is hence:
Cλ⊥
def
= C∩ < λ >⊥
where < λ > denotes the vector space spanned by λ. It is a subspace of Cpub of codimension 1 if
λ /∈ C⊥. This strongly suggests that < C 2pub > should have an unusual low dimension since < C
2 >
has dimension 2k − 1 by Proposition 2. More exactly we have here:
Proposition 4.
1. < C 2pub > ⊂ < C
2 > + C ⋆ a + < a ⋆ a >
2. dim
(
< C 2pub >
)
6 3k − 1
The first fact follows immediately from Lemma 1 and the proof of this proposition is given in
Appendix A. Experimentally it has been observed that the upper-bound is quite sharp. Indeed, the
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dimension of < C 2pub > has always been found
3 to be equal to 3k − 1 in all our experiments when
choosing randomly the codes and Q.
The second observation is that when a basis g1, . . . ,gk of Cpub is chosen and l other random
elements z1, . . . ,zl, then we may expect that the dimension of the vector space generated by all
products zi ⋆ gj with i in {1, . . . , l} and j in {1, . . . , k} is the dimension of the full space < C
2
pub >
when l > 3. This is indeed the case when l > 4 but it is not true for l = 3 since we have the
following result.
Proposition 5. Let B be the linear code spanned by
{
zi ⋆ gj | 1 6 i 6 3 and 1 6 j 6 k
}
. It holds
that dim (B) 6 3k − 3.
An explanation of this phenomenon is given in Appendix A. Experimentally, it turns out that
almost always this upper-bound is quite tight and the dimension is generally 3k − 3. But if we
assume now that z1, z2, z3 all belong to Cλ⊥ , which happens with probability
1
q3
since Cλ⊥ is a
subspace of Cpub of codimension 1 (at least when λ /∈ C
⊥), then the vectors zi ⋆ gj generate a
subspace with a much smaller dimension.
Proposition 6. If zi is in Cλ⊥ for i in {1, 2, 3} then for all j in {1, . . . , k}:
zi ⋆ gj ⊂ < C
2 > + < z1 ⋆ a > + < z2 ⋆ a > + < z3 ⋆ a > (5)
and if B is the linear code spanned by
{
zi ⋆ gj | 1 6 i 6 3 and 1 6 j 6 k
}
then
dim (B) 6 2k + 2. (6)
The proof of this proposition is straightforward and is given in Appendix A. The upper-bound
given in (6) on the dimension follows immediately from (5). This leads to Algorithm 1 which
computes a basis of Cλ⊥ . It is essential that the condition in (1) holds in order to distinguish the
case when the dimension is less than or equal to 2k + 2 from higher dimensions.
The first phase of the attack, namely finding a suitable triple z1,z2,z3 runs in expected time
of the form O
(
k3q3
)
because each test in the repeat loop 1 has a chance of 1
q3
to succeed. Indeed,
Cλ⊥ is of codimension 1 in Cpub and therefore a fraction
1
q of elements of Cpub belongs to Cλ⊥ . The
whole algorithm runs in expected time of the form O
(
k3q3
)
+ O
(
k4q
)
= O
(
k3q3
)
since k = O(q)
and the first phase of the attack is dominant in the complexity. Once Cλ⊥ is recovered, it still
remains to recover the secret code and a. The problem at hand can be formulated like this: we
know a very large subcode, namely Cλ⊥ , of a GRS code that we want to recover. This is exactly the
problem which was solved in [Wie10]. Applying the approach of this paper to our problem amounts
to compute < C 2
λ⊥
> which turns out to be equal to GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y) (see [MCMMP11b] for
more details). It suffices to use the Sidelnikov and Shestakov algorithm [SS92] to compute a pair
(x,y ⋆y) describing < C 2
λ⊥
> as a GRS code. From this, we deduce a pair (x,y) defining the secret
code C as a GRS code. The final phase, that is, recovering a possible (λ,a) pair and using it to
decode the public code Cpub, is detailed in Appendix B.
3 There are however cases where the dimension might be even smaller. Let us take for instance a ∈ GRSl(x,y)
for some integer l > 1 where GRSk(x,y) = C . From Proposition 2 we know that < C
2 >= GRS2k−1(x,y ⋆ y)
and it can be checked similarly that C ⋆ a ⊂ GRSk+l−1(x,y ⋆ y). It follows immediately from the first statement
of Proposition 4 that the dimension of < C 2pub > is upperbounded by max{2k − 1, k + l − 1} + 1 which can be
obviously smaller than 3k − 1.
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Algorithm 1 Recovering Cλ⊥ .
Input: A basis {g1, . . . , gk} of Cpub.
Output : A basis L of Cλ⊥ .
1: repeat
2: for 1 6 i 6 3 do
3: Randomly choose zi in Cpub
4: end for
5: B ← <
{
zi ⋆ gj | 1 6 i 6 3 and 1 6 j 6 k
}
>
6: until dim(B) 6 2k + 2 and dim (< z1,z2,z3 >) = 3
7: L ← {z1,z2,z3}
8: s← 4
9: while s 6 k − 1 do
10: repeat
11: Randomly choose zs in Cpub
12: T ← <
{
zi ⋆ gj | i ∈ {1, 2, s} and 1 6 j 6 k
}
>
13: until dim(T ) 6 2k + 2 and dim (< L ∪ {zs} >) = s
14: L ← L ∪ {zs}
15: s← s+ 1
16: end while
17: return L;
4.2 Using duality when the rate is larger than 1
2
The codes suggested in [BBC+11, §5.1.1,§5.1.2] are all of rate significantly larger than 12 , for instance
Example 1 p.15 suggests a GRS code of length 255, dimension 195 over GF (256), whereas Example
2. p.15 suggests a GRS code of length 511, dimension 395 over GF (512). The attack suggested
in the previous subsection only applies to rates smaller than 12 . There is a simple way to adapt
the previous attack for this case by considering the dual C⊥pub of the public code. Note that by
Proposition 3, there exists y′ in GF (q)n for which we have C⊥ = GRSn−k(x,y
′). Moreover, C⊥pub
displays a similar structure as Cpub.
Lemma 2. For any c from C⊥pub there exists an element p in C
⊥ such that:
c = p+ (p · a)b. (7)
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. It implies that the whole approach of the
previous subsection can be carried out over C⊥pub. It allows to recover the secret code C
⊥ and
therefore also C . This attack needs that 2(n − k) + 2 < n, that is 2k > n + 2. In summary,
there is an attack as soon as k is outside a narrow interval around n/2 which is [n−22 ,
n+2
2 ] . We
have implemented this attack on magma for the aforementioned set of parameters suggested in
[BBC+11], namely n = 255, q = 28, k = 195 and the average running time over 25 attacks was
about 2 weeks.
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A Proofs of Section 4
The first result that will be used throughout this section is a lemma expressing RΠ−1 in terms of
two vectors in GF (q)n:
Lemma 3. Assume that R is of rank 1, then RΠ−1 is of rank 1 and there exist a and b in GF (q)n
such that
RΠ−1 = bTa.
Proof. The dimension of the column space of R is the same as the dimension of the column space
of RΠ−1. Since R is of rank 1, this column space has dimension 1 which implies that RΠ−1 is
also of rank 1. From the fact that the column space of RΠ is of dimension 1, this implies that we
can find b1, . . . , bn and a1, . . . , an in GF (q) such that
RΠ−1 = (biaj)16i6n
16j6n
.
We let a
def
= (aj)16j6n and b
def
= (bi)16i6n. ⊓⊔
From now on we define
P
def
= I +RΠ−1 = I + bTa.
We will also need the following lemma
Lemma 4. If Q is invertible, then so is P and
P−1 = I −
1
1 + a · b
bTa.
Proof. We first observe that Q =Π+R = (I+RΠ−1)Π = PΠ . Therefore P is invertible if and
only if Q is invertible. Moreover
P
(
I −
1
1 + a · b
bTa
)
=
(
I + bTa
)(
I −
1
1 + a · b
bTa
)
= I +
(
1−
1
1 + a · b
)
bTa−
1
1 + a · b
bTabTa
= I +
a · b
1 + a · b
bTa−
a · b
1 + a · b
bTa
= I.
⊓⊔
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let
λ
def
= −P−1bT = −
(
I −
1
1 + a · b
bTa
)
bT
= −bT +
a · b
1 + a · b
bT
= −
1
1 + a · b
bT . (8)
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Let c be an element of Cpub. Since Csec = CpubQ = Cpub(Π+R) = Cpub(I+RΠ
−1)Π = CpubPΠ
we obtain CsecΠ
−1 = CpubP and therefore
Cpub = (CsecΠ
−1)P−1 = CP−1.
From this obtain that there exists p in C such that
c = pP−1
= p
(
I −
1
1 + a · b
bTa
)
= p−
b · p
1 + a · b
a
= p+ (λ · p)a.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Let c and c′ be two elements in Cpub. By applying Lemma 1 to them we know that there exist two
elements p and p′ in C such that
c = p+ (λ · p)a
c′ = p′ + (λ · p′)a.
This implies that
c ⋆ c′ = (p+ (λ · p)a) ⋆ (p′ + (λ · p′)a)
= p ⋆ p′ + ((λ · p)p′ + (λ · p′)p) ⋆ a+ (λ · p)(λ · p′)a ⋆ a (9)
It will be convenient to bring the notation
xi = x ⋆ x ⋆ . . . ⋆ x︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
.
In other words with this notation, C = GRSk(x,y) is generated by the y⋆x
i’s for i in {0, 1, . . . , k−
1}. Since λ /∈ C⊥, there exists i0 ∈ {0, . . . , k−1} such that λ ·(y⋆x
i0) 6= 0. For i in {0, 1, . . . , k−1},
let
ui
def
= λ · (y ⋆ xi0)y ⋆ xi + λ · (y ⋆ xi)y ⋆ xi0 + λ · (y ⋆ xi0)λ · (y ⋆ xi)a
vij
def
= λ · (y ⋆ xj)y ⋆ xi + λ · (y ⋆ xi)y ⋆ xj + λ · (y ⋆ xi)λ · (y ⋆ xj)a
We claim that
Lemma 5. Let V be the vector space generated by the vij’s for i, j in {0, 1, . . . , k−1}. The dimen-
sion of V is less than or equal to k.
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Proof. We prove that V is generated by the ui’s for i in {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. This can be proved by
noticing that
λ·y⋆xj
λ·y⋆xi0
ui +
λ·y⋆xi
λ·y⋆xi0
uj −
(λ·y⋆xi)(λ·y⋆xj)
(λ·y⋆xi0 )(λ·y⋆xi0 )
ui0
= (λ · y ⋆ xj)y ⋆ xi + (λ·y⋆x
i)(λ·y⋆xj)
λ·y⋆xi0
y ⋆ xi0 + (λ · y ⋆ xi)(λ · y ⋆ xj)a
+
(λ · y ⋆ xi)y ⋆ xj + (λ·y⋆x
i)(λ·y⋆xj)
λ·y⋆xi0
y ⋆ xi0 + (λ · y ⋆ xi)(λ · y ⋆ xj)a
−(
2 (λ·y⋆x
i)(λ·y⋆xj)
λ·y⋆xi0
y ⋆ xi0 + (λ · y ⋆ xi)(λ · y ⋆ xj)a
)
= (λ · y ⋆ xj)y ⋆ xi + (λ · y ⋆ xi)y ⋆ xj + (λ · y ⋆ xi)(λ · y ⋆ xj)a
= vij
⊓⊔
To simplify notation we assume here that ⋆ takes precedence over the dot product, that is λ·y⋆xj =
λ · (y ⋆xj). Observe now that Equation (9) implies that c⋆c′ belongs to < C 2 > +V ⋆a. The space
generated by the c⋆c′’s has therefore a dimension which is is upper-bounded by 2k−1+k = 3k−1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
This follows immediately from the fact that we can express zi in terms of the gj ’s, say
zi =
∑
16j6k
aijgj .
We observe now that we have the following three relations between the zi ⋆ gj’s:∑
16j6n
a2jz1 ⋆ gj −
∑
16j6n
a1jz2 ⋆ gj = 0 (10)
∑
16j6n
a3jz1 ⋆ gj −
∑
16j6n
a1jz3 ⋆ gj = 0 (11)
∑
16j6n
a2jz3 ⋆ gj −
∑
16j6n
a3jz2 ⋆ gj = 0 (12)
(10) can be verified as follows∑
16j6n
a2jz1 ⋆ gj −
∑
16j6n
a1jz2 ⋆ gj = z1 ⋆ z2 − z1 ⋆ z2 = 0.
The two remaining identities can be proved in a similar fashion.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Assume that the zi’s all belong to Cλ⊥ . For every gj there exists pj in C such that gj = pj+λ·pja.
We obtain now
zi ⋆ gj = zi ⋆ (pj + (λ · pj)a)
= zi ⋆ pj + (λ · pj)zi ⋆ a
∈ < C 2 > + < z1 ⋆ a > + < z2 ⋆ a > + < z3 ⋆ a > (13)
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This proves the first part of the proposition, the second part follows immediately from the first part
since it implies that the dimension of the vector space generated by the zi ⋆ gj’s is upperbounded
by the sum of the dimension of < C 2 > (that is 2k − 1) and the dimension of the vector space
spanned by the zi ⋆ a’s (which is at most 3).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
The key to Lemma 2 is the fact that the dual of Cpub is equal to C
⊥P T . Indeed Cpub = CP
−1 and
therefore for any element c of Cpub there exists an element p of C such that c = pP
−1. Observe
now that every element c⊥ in C⊥pub satisfies c · c
⊥ = 0 and that
0 = c · c⊥ = pP−1 · c⊥ = p · c⊥
(
P−1
)T
.
Therefore C⊥pub = C
⊥P T . This discussion implies that there exists an element p⊥ in C⊥ such that
c⊥ = p⊥P T
= p⊥
(
I + bTa
)T
= p⊥ + p⊥aTb
= p⊥ + (p⊥ · a)b.
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B Recovering a and λ from C and Cλ⊥
B.1 The structure of Cpub ∩ C and C
⊥
pub ∩ C
⊥
The attack which was given in Section 4 enables to find C and Cλ⊥ which is equal to the intersection
Cpub ∩ C . From this we deduce C
⊥ and C⊥ ∩ C⊥pub. These intersections are related to λ and a by
Lemma 6.
Cpub ∩ C = {p ∈ C |p · λ = 0} (14)
C
⊥
pub ∩ C
⊥ = {p ∈ C⊥|p · a = 0} (15)
Proof. Since it is assumed that λ /∈ C⊥, we deduce that C1
def
= {p ∈ C |p ·λ = 0} is a subcode of C
of dimension k − 1. Let p be an element of C1. Notice now that c
def
= p+ (λ · p)a belongs to Cpub
from Lemma 1 and that c = p since λ · p = 0 by definition of C1. Therefore C1 ⊂ Cpub ∩ C . Since
Cpub 6= C by assumption, we obtain that dim (Cpub ∩ C ) < k. This implies that C1 = Cpub ∩ C
because the dimension of C1 is k − 1 as explained above. This proves Equation (14).
To prove Equation (15), let us first compute the dimension of C⊥pub ∩ C
⊥:
dim(C⊥pub ∩ C
⊥) = dim(C⊥pub) + dim(C
⊥)− dim(C⊥pub + C
⊥) (16)
= (n− k) + (n− k)− dim ((Cpub ∩ C ))
⊥ (17)
= (n− k) + (n− k)− (n− (k − 1)) (18)
= n− k − 1. (19)
Let C2
def
= {p ∈ C⊥|p · a = 0}. We first claim that dimC2 = n− k − 1.
If this were not the case we would have dimC2 = n− k which would imply that C2 = C
⊥ and
a ∈ C . Consider now an element c of C⊥pub. By Lemma 2 we know that there exists p in C
⊥ such
that c = p+(a ·p)b. Since (a,p) = 0, this would imply that c = p and that c would also be in C⊥.
This would prove that C⊥ = C⊥pub which would itself imply that C = Cpub. This is a contradiction.
We finish the proof similarly to the previous case by invoking Lemma 2 for an element p in C2
and arguing that:
(i) c = p+ (a · p)b is in C⊥pub by Lemma 2,
(ii) c = p because a ·p = 0 and therefore C2 ⊂ C
⊥
pub∩C
⊥. The equality of both subspaces is proved
by a dimension argument (both have dimension n− k − 1). ⊓⊔
B.2 Recovering a valid (a, λ) pair
Choose now an arbitrary element r1 in C
⊥
pub \ C
⊥ and choose any element b0 in (Cpub ∩ C )
⊥ \ C⊥
and any element a0 in (C
⊥
pub ∩ C
⊥)⊥ \ C such that
a0 · r1 6= 0 (20)
a0 · b0 = 0 (21)
This is obviously possible by arguing on the dimensions of (Cpub ∩C )
⊥ and (C⊥pub ∩ C
⊥)⊥. We are
going to show that up to a multiplicative constant these two elements can be chosen as a valid
(a,λ) pair, where we use the following definition
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Definition 3 (valid (a,λ) pair for (Cpub,C )). We say that a couple (a0,λ0) of elements of
GF (q)n ×GF (q)n forms a valid (a,λ) pair for (Cpub,C ) if and only if
(i) a0 · λ0 6= −1,
(ii) for any element c in Cpub there exists an element p in C such that c = p+ (λ0 · p)a0.
We will see in Subsection B.3 that we can easily decode the public code Cpub with the help of such
a valid (a,λ) pair.
We first observe that
Lemma 7. There exist α0 and β0 in GF (q) \ {0}, p0 in C , q0 in C
⊥ such that
a0 = p0 + α0a (22)
b0 = q0 + β0b. (23)
Proof. (Cpub ∩ C )
⊥ is a subspace of dimension n − k + 1 which contains C⊥ and λ, and therefore
also b. b does not belong to C⊥ since λ is assumed to be outside C⊥. This implies that
(Cpub ∩ C )
⊥ = C⊥+ < b > (24)
Since b0 does not belong to C
⊥ by definition, there necessarily exist β0 in GF (q) \ {0} and q0 in
C⊥ such that
b0 = q0 + β0b.
The statement on a0 is proved similarly. ⊓⊔
Choose now an arbitrary element p1 in C \ Cpub. Let
γ
def
=
−(p1 · r1)
(b0 · p1)(a0 · r1)
(25)
This definition make sense because a0 ·r1 6= 0 by choice of a0 and b0 ·p1 6= 0 because p1 ∈ C \Cpub
and by the characterization of the intersection C ∩ Cpub of Lemma 6.
Proposition 7. (a0, γb0) is a valid (a,λ) pair for (Cpub,C ).
Proof. The first property of an (a,λ) pair is clearly met:
a0 · γb0 = 0 6= −1
by using (21).
Let us now prove that for every p in C , we have
p+ γb0 · pa0 ∈ Cpub.
First consider a p which belongs to C ∩ Cpub. We have
γb0 · p = γβ0b+ q0 · p
= γ (β0b · p+ q0 · p)
= 0
because β0b ·p = 0 from the characterization of C ∩Cpub given in Lemma 6 and q0 ·p = 0 because
q0 belongs to C
⊥ and p belongs to C . This implies
p+ (γb0 · p)a0 = p
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which belongs to Cpub by definition of p.
Let us prove now that c1
def
= p1 + (γb0 · p1)a0 also belongs to Cpub. For this purpose we are
going to prove that c1 is orthogonal to all elements of C
⊥
pub. We achieve this by first proving that
c1 is orthogonal to any element q2 in the intersection C
⊥
pub ∩ C
⊥:
c1 · q2 = (p1 + (γb0 · p1)a0) · q2
= p1 · q2 + γ(b0 · p1)a0 · q2
= 0
because p1 · q2 = 0 from the fact that p1 ∈ C and q2 ∈ C
⊥ and a0 · q2 = 0 by using the
characterization of C⊥pub ∩ C
⊥ given in Lemma 6. We finish the proof by proving that c1 is also
orthogonal to r1:
c1 · r1 = (p1 + (γb0 · p1)a0) · r1
= p1 · r1 + γ(b0 · p1)a0 · r1
= p1 · r1 −
p1 · r1
(b0 · p1)(a0 · r1)
(b0 · p1)(a0 · r1)
= 0.
This implies that c1 belongs to Cpub. Notice now that the mapping φ : u→ u+(γb0 ·u)a0 is a one-
to-one linear mapping whose inverse is given by v → v+(δ ·v)a0 where δ = −
1
1+γb0·a0
γb0 = −γb0
since γb0 · a0 = 0 by using (21). We have therefore proved that a basis of C is transformed into a
basis of Cpub by the mapping φ. By linearity of the mapping, we deduce that for any element c in
Cpub there exists an element p in C such that c = p+ (γb0 · p)a0. ⊓⊔
B.3 Decoding the public code
Assume that we have a valid (a,λ) pair for (Cpub,C ), say it is (a0,λ0). We want to decode the
vector z
def
= c + e where e is an error of a certain Hamming weight which can be corrected by the
decoding algorithm chosen for C and c is an element of the public code. We know that there exists
p in C such that
c = p+ (λ0 · p)a0. (26)
We compute z(α)
def
= z + αa0 for all elements α in GF (q). One of these elements α is equal to
−λ0 · p and we obtain z(α) = p+ e in this case. Decoding z(α) in C will reveal p and this gives c
by using (26).
